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FROM "REAL RAPE" TO REAL 
JUSTICE? REFLECTIONS ON THE 
EFFICACY OF MORE THAN 35 YEARS 
OF FEMINISM, ACTIVISM AND LAW 
REFORM 
Elisabeth McDonald* 
In this article, the author develops her observations made during the 2012 Suffrage Lecture at the 
University of Otago. Using the lecture as the starting point, the article considers what law reform 
over more than 35 years has actually achieved, with a specific focus on the admissibility of evidence 
about a complainant's previous sexual experience in a criminal case involving rape allegations. It 
concludes that although policy makers and legislators have been responsive to the concerns 
expressed by complainants about their treatment in the trial process, little real change to that 
experience has occurred. More fundamental work needs to be done by way of preventative 
education, challenging rape mythology and developing new processes to resolve allegations of 
sexual offending. These are the challenges for the next 35 years.  
I INTRODUCTION 
I was asked to speak at the University of Otago in 20121 following the publication of a jointly 
authored book: From "Real Rape" to Real Justice: Prosecuting Rape in New Zealand.2 In this work 
we made a number of recommendations for reform of law and practice regarding the prosecution of 
sexual offending – some of which have been picked up and developed by the Law Commission, as I 
will discuss later in this article. In doing that work, however, I was reminded again that despite 
  
*  Associate Professor, School of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. My thanks to Scott Optican for his 
helpful comments during the writing of this piece. 
1  Elisabeth McDonald "From 'Real Rape' to Real Justice? A look at the efficacy of 35 years of feminism, 
activism and law reform" (Suffrage Lecture 2012, University of Otago, Dunedin, September 2012). 
2  Elisabeth McDonald and Yvette Tinsley (eds) From "Real Rape" to Real Justice: Prosecuting Rape in New 
Zealand (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2011). 
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decades of law reform many issues remain, and remain the same. As historical commentary, it is 
fitting to build on my earlier observations as part of this Special Issue of the Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review, published to commemorate the first woman law graduate from Victoria 
University. Although Harriette Vine was not a criminal lawyer, no doubt she would have been very 
aware of the particular struggles faced by female victims of crime. In this article, as I did in the 
Suffrage Lecture, I will explore the lack of real change and what remains to be done in order to 
effect real justice for victims of sexual offending. 
Over the last 35 years there has been a significant amount of research aimed at identifying, and 
changing, aspects of the criminal justice processes which impact adversely, and unfairly, on victims 
of sexual offending – especially those who have not been victims of what is referred to as "real 
rape". 3  However, more recently there is a similar amount of research demonstrating that 
implementing law reform, whether substantive or procedural, is inadequate to bring about "real 
justice" unless accompanied by other long-term community-wide initiatives.4 
To evaluate whether law reform has resulted in real justice, it is necessary to identify the goals 
of the relevant reforms. If the aim of the reforms was to decrease the incidence of sexual violence 
while also increasing the reporting and conviction rates, there has been mixed success.5 While there 
appears to be a recent increase in the number of offences reported, there has been no significant 
change with regard to either the occurrence of sexual violence or conviction rates.6 If the aim was to 
make a difference to victims' experiences of the criminal justice processes, such that the impact of 
participating in the prosecution of the alleged offender was not traumatic and distressing of itself, 
the report card equally reveals a picture of limited success.7 In the words of Louise Nicholas, the 
  
3  For an early definition of "real rape", see Martha R Burt "Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape" (1980) 38 
J of Personality & Social Psych 217; and Susan Estrich "Rape" (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1087 at 1088 and 1092. 
More recently see Joanne Conaghan and Yvette Russell "Rape Myths, Law and Feminist Research: 'Myths 
about Myths'" (2014) 22 Feminist Legal Studies 25. 
4  Jennifer Temkin and Barbara Krahé Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2008). 
5  Liz Kelly, Jo Lovett, Gordana Uzelac and Miranda Horvath Rape in the 21st century: Old behaviours, new 
contexts and emerging patterns (Economic and Social Research Council, End of Award Report RES-000-
22-1679, Swindon, 2007); Temkin and Krahé, above n 4, at 9–23. 
6  Elisabeth McDonald and Rachel Souness "From 'Real Rape' to Real Justice in New Zealand Aotearoa: the 
reform project" in McDonald and Tinsley, above n 2, at 31.  
7  Temkin and Krahé, above n 4, at 127–142; Venezia Marlene Kingi and others Responding to Sexual 
Violence: pathways to recovery (Ministry of Women's Affairs, October 2009) [Responding to Sexual 
Violence]; Gender Bias and the Law Project Heroines of Fortitude: The experience of women in court as 
victims of sexual assault (Department for Women, NSW, 1996); Elisabeth McDonald "'Real Rape' in New 
Zealand: Women Complainants' Experience of the Court Process" (1997) 1 Yearbook of New Zealand 
Jurisprudence 59. 
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New Zealand rape complainant who rejected anonymity to disclose her allegations against police 
officers which were not initially acted on:8   
As someone who has been through the judicial system seven times in the last 15 years, I know the 
failings of our system but I am also hearing very loudly and very clearly from other victims/survivors 
that our court system does not give justice to victims of sexual violence. Survivors have told me that it is 
a system that unfairly supports the rights of offenders. Many survivors have complained to me that they 
experienced only intimidation, re-victimisation and re-traumatisation.  
Although the goal of some reform proposals, and some law and policy makers, is to increase the 
conviction rate for sexual offending, this is not always the aim of victims.9 Victim advocates and 
others working in the sector report, as they did to us, that for many victims the resolution process is 
more important than the outcome.10 To be listened to, to have their experience validated and to be 
well treated by the professionals they come into contact with tends to have a greater effect on 
overall victim satisfaction with the criminal justice system, and most likely their long-term 
recovery.11 Research to date indicates that specialisation of those involved in the prevention and 
prosecution of sexual offences and of those providing treatment and therapy is "best practice", and 
therefore likely to result in the best outcomes for both offenders and victims.12 
In this article I continue the discussion of what might amount to "best practice", beginning with 
a specific focus on the admission of evidence about a complainant's sexual history. I see the 
admission of such evidence as demonstrating how rape myths, which support the schema of what is 
a "real rape", continue to be reinforced in the trial process. It is not just the substance of the 
questions relating to sexual history that is of concern to complainants however – the process of 
cross-examination is often reported as being unnecessarily unpleasant and disrespectful.13 Although 
there has been much substantive and procedural reform, there has been no significant change to how 
  
8  Te Ohaakii a Hine – National Network Ending Sexual Violence Together Report of the Task Force for 
Action on Sexual Violence (Ministry of Justice, 2009) at 79. 
9  Nor should it be, argues Wendy Larcombe in "Falling Rape Conviction Rate: (Some) Feminist Aims and 
Measures for Rape Law" (2011) 19 Feminist Legal Studies 27. 
10  Ministry of Women's Affairs Restoring Soul: effective interventions for adult victim/survivors of sexual 
violence (Wellington, 2009) at 69. See also Sara C Benesh and Susan E Howell "Confidence in the Courts: 
A Comparison of Users and Non-users" (2001) 19 Behavioural Science and the Law 199 at 210.  
11  Sara Payne in Rape: The Victim Experience Review (Home Office, November 2009) lists victim needs at 14. 
Jennifer Temkin notes prosecutor treatment has a far greater impact on victim satisfaction than the outcome 
of the case: Jennifer Temkin Rape and the Legal Process (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 
at 271–272. 
12  See Ministry of Women's Affairs, above n 10, at 70. 
13  Ivana Bacik, Catherine Maunsell and Susan Gogan The Legal Process and Victims of Rape (The Dublin 
Rape Crisis Centre, September 1998); and the research cited in n 7 above. 
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complainants report their experience of the trial process. Despite the public outcry regarding the 
acquittals of those charged with raping Louise Nicholas,14 and more recently in relation to the 
"Roast Busters" sex scandal,15 the changes that may really be required – changes to attitudes 
regarding intimate communication and interaction – seem far away. My critique of the New Zealand 
rape shield provision also demonstrates the ongoing and pressing need, not just for law change, but 
for societal change – through preventative education and challenges to rape mythology, within and 
outside the criminal justice system.  
II  HISTORY AND CRITIQUE OF NEW ZEALAND'S "RAPE 
SHIELD" PROVISION 
The reference to "more than 35 years" in the title of this article recognises the introduction of an 
important rule dealing with the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's sexual experience with 
a person other than the defendant, during a trial dealing with allegations of sexual violence. The rule 
is sometimes referred to as a "rape shield" provision.16 Section 23A of the Evidence Act 1908 came 
into force on 29 July 1977, and, as the author of a number of articles discussing the application of 
this section, I was always aware that it was introduced some eight years before the raft of other 
significant reforms came into effect in 1986 regarding the prosecution of sexual offending, 
including changes to the definition of sexual violation and the criminalisation of rape within 
marriage.17  
I had often wondered what had given rise to this earlier legislative reform but it was not until 
preparing for the Suffrage Lecture, I am embarrassed to admit, that I actually spent time trying to 
find out who were those (I presumed) successful feminists. They were able to effectively lobby for 
this amendment, which was introduced on 18 August 1976 under a National Government consisting 
of 53 men and two women, (with 30 men and two women on the Opposition benches).  
The answer is that the amendment formed part of a Private Member's Bill, which had been 
foreshadowed in the Member of Parliament (MP) for Birkenhead's maiden speech earlier that year – 
and was later drawn from the ballot (like the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill 
was on 26 July 2012).18 The Private Member's Bill was championed by the maker of that maiden 
speech – a Mr Jim McLay (a National MP). Again, I am embarrassed to admit my money was 
firmly on the National MP for Raglan at the time, a person significantly more well known as a 
  
14  Louise Nicholas with Philip Kitchin Louise Nicholas: My Story (Random House, Auckland, 2014). 
15  "Expert appointed to head Roast Busters probe" (11 November 2013) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>.  
16  T Brettel Dawson "Sexual Assault Law and Past Sexual Conduct of the Primary Witness: The Construction 
of Relevance" (1988) 2 Canadian Journal of Women & the Law 310. 
17  Gerry Orchard "Sexual Violation: The Rape Law Reform Legislation" (1986) 12 NZULR 97. 
18  Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill 2012 (39-1). 
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women's rights activist, Marilyn Waring. Notwithstanding its surprising beginnings, the Bill was 
widely supported during the Select Committee process by many groups including the New Zealand 
Law Society, the New Zealand University Students Association, the National Council of Women, 
the Women's Electoral Lobby and a group that no longer seems to be active under their name at this 
time:  the Te Awamutu Feminists. 
Mr McLay said in introducing the Bill:19 
In my opinion the previous sexual history of the alleged victim with third parties – persons other than 
the accused – is unlikely to be of any significance when determining whether [the victim] might have 
consented to have sexual intercourse with the accused. Whether one thinks it is right or wrong, sexual 
experience with a third party is no longer – in this society of ours – necessarily indicative of a 
willingness to consent to sexual intercourse with the accused.  
I agree with this unexpectedly radical statement made on 18 August 1976. The relevant part of 
section that was enacted provided:20 
In any case of a sexual nature, no evidence shall be given, and no question shall be put to a witness, 
relating directly or indirectly to – 
(a) The sexual experience of the complainant with any person other than the accused; or  
(b) The reputation of the complainant in sexual matters, –  
except by leave of the Judge.  
Section 23A(3) of the Evidence Act 1908 further provided that leave should not be granted 
unless:  
[T]he Judge is satisfied that the evidence [of the complainant's sexual experience with a person other 
than the accused] … is of such direct relevance … that to exclude it would be contrary to the interests of 
justice. 
This admissibility rule was importantly subject to a proviso:21 
Provided that any such evidence or question shall not be regarded as being of such direct relevance by 
reason only of any inference it may raise as to the general disposition or propensity of the complainant 
in sexual matters. 
The purpose of the specific admissibility rule (which introduced a heightened relevance test) 
was to prevent any illegitimate or irrelevant inferences being drawn about the credibility of the 
complainant or the likelihood that the offending occurred based solely on whether the complainant 
  
19  (18 August 1976) 405 NZPD 1753 (emphasis added). 
20  Section 23A(2) (as amended by s 2 of the Evidence Amendment Act 1997). 
21  Evidence Act 1908, s 23A(3) (emphasis added). 
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had previous sexual experience. Although less likely now, it is hoped, there was research at that 
time and in the early 1980s that suggested that fact-finders (as well as police officers) would treat 
unmarried women who were sexually active as being of bad character and consequently 
untrustworthy.22  
Section 23A was replaced by s 44 when the Evidence Act 2006 came into force on 1 August 
2007. With one important exception, regarding the bar on reputation evidence introduced in s 44(2), 
the admissibility rule is essentially identical to that introduced in 1977. Considering the scope and 
rationale of s 44 the Court of Appeal in R v Clode stated:23 
[24] Section 44 of the Evidence Act (and its predecessors) were enacted to prevent the entirely 
reprehensible and inappropriate blackening of the characters of particularly women complainants by 
directly or indirectly "tarring" them in the eyes of the jury.  
To this rationale of the rape shield provision should be added the further rationale discussed in 
other cases – the desirability of protecting the complainant from having to "re-live" earlier events of 
sexual abuse,24 or from cross-examination that may "re-traumatise the victim".25 In the words of 
William Young J in 2013:26 
The policies primarily underlying s 44 are that those who allege sexual offending should not be subject 
to humiliating cross-examination and that trials for sexual offences should not be derailed by collateral 
inquiries of little or no actual relevance into the complainant's sexual experiences. 
  
22  Warren Young Rape Study Volume 1: A discussion of law and practice (Department of Justice, Wellington, 
1983) at 130.  
23  R v Clode [2007] NZCA 447 at [24]. See also the Court's reference to s 8(2) at [22]. These passages were 
quoted with approval in R v Sutherland [2010] NZCA 154 at [19] and [23]. In W (CA537/12) v R [2012] 
NZCA 567 at [11] the Court of Appeal cited Clode and stated that the jury should not be invited to "draw 
the inference that [the complainant] is promiscuous and so unworthy of belief, which is the very risk that s 
44 is intended to control". 
24  See R v C (CA228/10) [2010] NZCA 147 at [14]; R v Scott DC Dunedin CRI-2009-005-344, 12 May 2011 
at [6]. In TPN v R [2010] NZCA 291 the Court of Appeal allowed the defence to question a complainant in 
relation to her being also raped when she was around 12 years old by two uncles on two separate occasions. 
The impact on the complainant of having to answer such questions was not expressly factored into the 
Court's decision. In the case the Court noted the absence of any evidence to suggest that there had been 
"transferred attribution from actual offender to present accused" (at [14] and [17])  although the Court also 
acknowledged the need to protect complainants "from unnecessary or inappropriate questioning about other 
sexual activity" (at [15]). 
25  Lindsay v R [2011] NZCA 500, [2012] 1 NZLR 62 at [11] and [17]; Cabinet Paper "Amendments to the 
Evidence Act 2006" (12 November 2013) CAB 100/2002/1 at [18]. 
26  B (SC12/2013) v R [2013] NZSC 151, [2014] 1 NZLR 261 at [112]. 
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Along with the other evidential rules, which apply specifically to sexual cases, rape shield 
provisions have attracted much academic analysis.27 Complainants have also been asked to report 
the extent to which they have been questioned about their sexual history at trial.28  
A number of replicated findings and commonly held perspectives may be distilled from the 
significant literature on this topic:  
(a)  Complainants consider it distressing, irrelevant, embarrassing, unfair and distracting to be 
asked about their previous sexual experience.  Complainant distress impacts on the quality 
of evidence they are able to give. The fact that victims of sexual offences know they may 
well be asked about their sexual experience may well be a factor in low reporting rates.29  
(b) Admission of evidence concerning a complainant's sexual history makes it more likely the 
fact-finder will attribute blame to the complainant and less likely they will consider the 
defendant's conduct criminal. (This is more likely to occur when the evidence concerns 
the complainant's sexual history with the defendant – evidence not currently subject to s 
44.) The prejudice arising from such evidence cannot be meaningfully countered by a 
direction from the judge, nor does it appear that "limited use" directions are an effective 
way of ensuring that the evidence is used by the jury only for specific purposes (for 
example, to assist the decision about the defendant's belief about the complainant's 
consent and not for the impermissible purpose of informing jury opinion about the 
credibility of the complainant). 
(c)  The admission of sexual history evidence has traditionally not been appropriately 
controlled in the absence of a specific rule. That is, subjecting the evidence to a relevance 
requirement has not been sufficient to prevent the admission of irrelevant and highly 
prejudicial sexual history evidence.  
(d) Rape shield provisions that allow for the exercise of judicial discretion (as in New 
Zealand) may be a less effective way of preventing the introduction of irrelevant and 
prejudicial sexual history evidence. Category-based exclusion provisions are arguably 
  
27  Jennifer Temkin "Sexual History Evidence: the Ravishment of Section 2" [1993] Crim LR 3; Aileen 
McGolgan "Common Law and the Relevance of Sexual History Evidence" (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 275; Elisabeth McDonald "Syllogistic Reasoning and Rape Law" (1994) 10 Women's Studies 
Journal 41; Sue Lees Carnal Knowledge: rape on trial (2nd ed, Women's Press Ltd, London, 2002); Regina 
A Schuller and Marc A Klippenstine "The Impact of Complainant Sexual History Evidence on Jurors' 
Decisions: Considerations From a Psychological Perspective" (2004) 10 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 
321; Jennifer Temkin "Sexual History Evidence: Beware the Backlash" [2003] Crim LR 217. 
28  Gender Bias and the Law Project, above n 7; Bacik, Maunsell and Gogan, above n 13.  
29  See Liz Kelly, Jennifer Temkin and Sue Griffiths Section 41: An Evaluation of New Legislation Limiting 
Sexual History as Evidence in Rape Trials (Home Office Online Report 20/06, 2006) at 70. 
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more effective yet are more open to challenge on the basis of potential or actual unfairness 
to an accused.30  
A critique of the historical approach to questioning complainants about their sexual past has 
been succinctly stated by Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman:31 
Over the years some strange notions of relevance became embedded in the common law. For example, it 
was assumed that evidence of prostitution diminishes the credibility of a rape complainant and increases 
the probability that intercourse was consensual, when, on a dispassionate appraisal, one might expect 
prostitutes to be the last people to make false allegations of rape, since sending customers to gaol can 
hardly be good for business. Equally, a promiscuous person is not the most likely to concoct a false 
accusation of rape in order to protect her reputation, nor would one particularly expect a sexually 
experienced person (as opposed to a shrinking violet with no previous sexual history to exploit) to be 
overcome by shame or remorse into falsely accusing her partners of rape. All-too-frequently, it would 
appear, the real purpose of such cross-examination was to suggest that the complainant was herself too 
morally flawed to deserve the court's sympathy or to justify punishing the accused. 
Legislation in most common law jurisdictions does severely limit evidence of sexual experience 
with a person other than the defendant, if only offered to prove that the complainant consented, or 
that the defendant believed that she was consenting. It is likewise difficult to see how evidence of 
the complainant's reputation in sexual matters provides, of itself, grounds for the defendant 
believing she consented to sexual relations. Consent is, after all, given to a person, not a set of 
circumstances.32  
To explore the extent to which there have been, and remain, legitimate concerns about the 
application of New Zealand's rape shield provision, as elsewhere,33 I have in the past critiqued 
admissibility decisions by applying syllogistic reasoning. As the test in s 44 is one of heightened 
  
30  There is debate on this issue. See Carol Withey "Female Rape – an Ongoing Concern: Strategies for 
Improving Reporting and Conviction Levels" (2007) 71 JCL 54 at 82; Temkin, above n 11, at 224; Neil 
Kibble "Judicial Discretion and the Admissibility of Prior Sexual History Evidence under Section 41 of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999: Sometimes Sticking to your Guns Means Shooting Yourself 
in the Foot" [2005] Crim L Rev 263 at 267 and 273. 
31  Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman Criminal Evidence (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 
443–444. See also Dawson, above n 16, at 328: "Information made available to a jury concerning the 
primary witness's past sexual activity or non-conformity to a sex-role norms increases the responsibility for 
the assault that is attributed to her at the same time that it decreases perceptions of the accused's guilt."  
32  However this argument is not always reflected in decisions about the admissibility of sexual history 
evidence. See for example R v Bourke CA207/06, 15 August 2006; commentary on the case in Elisabeth 
McDonald "Complainant's Reputation in Sexual Matters" [2007] NZLJ 251; and the later Court of Appeal 
case Keegan v R [2010] NZCA 247 at [63]. 
33  See Mary Heath "The law and sexual offences against adults in Australia" (2005) 4 ACSSA 1 at 10; and 
Victoria Law Reform Commission Sexual Offences: Final Report (July 2004) at 201. 
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relevance, it is important to note that relevance is not an inherent characteristic of any item of 
evidence but exists only as a relation between the evidence and a matter in issue.34 Whether the 
relationship exists may depend on either experience or science.35 As relevance has historically been 
viewed as largely a matter of "logic and common sense",36 it is the judge's own knowledge of 
human conduct and motivation that is relied on to resolve relevance determinations in order to 
decide on admissibility – based on premises that may not always be articulated.37 
Decisions about relevance in the context of judicial admissibility rulings are sometimes thought 
to be helpfully guided by the use of (deductive) syllogistic reasoning.  Where the piece of evidence 
is the minor premise, the conclusion helps solve an issue in the case, and the major premise is, or 
should be, a "proposition the truth of which is likely to be accepted by the person who has to draw 
the conclusion – in the case of a lawsuit, a reasonable person".38  
The classic example of such syllogistic reasoning is:39  
All men are mortal (major premise).  
Socrates is a man (minor premise). 
Socrates is mortal (conclusion or deduction).  
This technique illustrates the need for careful articulation of a background generalisation (or 
premise) where the relevance of the evidence is disputed. It also demonstrates the extent to which 
decisions about relevance (and degrees of relevance) depend on the knowledge, experience and 
worldview of the decision maker. Delisle, Stuart and Tanovich make the argument for the use of 
syllogistic reasoning in this way:40 
We know that evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make the proposition for which it is tendered 
more probable than that proposition would be without the evidence. For evidence to have any value 
  
34  Elisabeth McDonald Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at 36. 
35  Jenny McEwan "Reasoning, Relevance and Law Reform: the influence of Empirical Research on Criminal 
Adjudication" in Paul Roberts and Mike Redmayne (eds) Innovations in Evidence and Proof: Integrating 
Theory, Research and Teaching (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) 187 at 191. 
36  Wi v R [2009] NZSC 121, [2010] 2 NZLR 11 at [25] citing R v A [2001] 1 WLR 789 (HL); Scott Optican 
and Peter Sankoff Evidence Act Revisited for Criminal Lawyers (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 
2010) at 27.   
37  Christine Boyle "A Principled Approach to Relevance: the Cheshire Cat in Canada" in Paul Roberts and 
Mike Redmayne (eds) Innovations in Evidence and Proof: Integrating Theory, Research and Teaching 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) 87 at 111. 
38  DL Mathieson Cross on Evidence (8th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at 25.  
39  See Mathieson, above n 38, at 25; and Roberts and Zuckerman, above n 31, at 143.  
40  Ron Delisle, Don Stuart and David Tanovich Evidence: Principles and Problems (8th ed, Thomson 
Carswell, Ontario, 2007) at 148. 
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there must be a premise, a generalization one makes, allowing the inference to be made. Borrowing from 
Professors Binder and Bergman, evidence that roses were in bloom, when tendered to prove that it was 
then springtime, has meaning only if we adopt the premise or generalization that roses usually bloom in 
the spring. The tendency of evidence to prove a proposition, and hence its relevance, depends on the 
validity of the premise which links the evidence to the proposition. The probative worth of the relevant 
evidence depends on the accuracy of the premise which supports the inference. Sometimes the premise 
will be indisputable, sometimes always true, sometimes often true and sometimes only rarely true. But a 
premise there must be. The next time someone says to you that the evidence is clearly relevant ask the 
proponent of the evidence to articulate for you what premise she is relying on. If she has no premise the 
evidence is irrelevant. If she has a premise you can debate with her the validity of the premise. What 
experience does she base it on? Is there contrary experience? Is the premise based on myth? Is the 
premise always true, sometimes or only rarely? These latter parameters do not affect relevance since 
relevance has a very low threshold but may affect the probative worth which may cause rejection of the 
evidence if the probative value is outweighed by competing considerations. Approaching discussions of 
relevance in this way may yield a more intelligent discussion than the often times typical exchange of 
conclusory opinions. 
Syllogistic reasoning was applied by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Alletson.41 The 
Court was asked to consider the admissibility of what would have previously been considered "good 
character" evidence about the appellant, James Alletson. To be admissible under the Act, the 
evidence to be given by an Anglican vicar needed to be substantially helpful to the assessment of the 
veracity of Alletson, or relevant as propensity (character) evidence. The Court discussed the 
evidence in terms of whether it could help establish the likelihood that Alletson did not commit the 
offence:42 
[43] Accepting for the purpose of argument that the proposed evidence of Reverend Woodman was 
propensity evidence, the issue for determination would be whether it would have tended to prove 
anything of consequence at the trial: s 7(3) of the 2006 Act. We do not believe that it would. The jury 
would have been asked to adopt the following chain of reasoning: the appellant was a religious person in 
  
41  R v Alletson [2009] NZCA 205 [Alletson]. Compare, however, the finding in Alletson to the view of the 
minority in Gharbal v R [2010] NZCA 45 at [30]:  
In this case, the proposed evidence that Mr Gharbal is polite and honest appears to have no 
relevance to his propensity for committing rape. That he is not the sort of person to commit rape is 
pure opinion evidence rather than showing negative propensity in the sense set out by the Supreme 
Court in Wi. I accept, however, that it is arguable that a person who is old fashioned and religious 
may be seen by some in the community as having a tendency to act in a morally correct manner 
(and therefore not rape someone). This evidence may thus have some slight relevance on the test in 
Wi. Likewise, that Mr Gharbal never acted inappropriately to another woman he encountered could 
have some relevance (although totally lacking in particularity, given that it is unknown if he was 
even ever alone with the witness). This means that some portion of the proposed character evidence 
may have been relevant and could have been led. 
42  Alletson, above n 41, at [43] and [44] (emphasis added). 
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his younger days and considered by a reputable figure in religious circles to be a decent person; a boy 
who is religious and is considered by a reputable person to be of good character is unl ikely to commit 
sexual offences against young girls; therefore, it is less likely that the appellant did so in this case.  
[44] While we accept that the evidence proves that the appellant was religious in his younger days 
(possibly at the time the offending occurred) and at that stage appeared to have a strong religious faith, 
we do not see this as tending to prove anything in issue in the present case. We do not see any logical 
connection between evidence of religiosity and general good character and the likelihood of a person 
having those characteristics committing sexual offences. In our view the chain of reasoning which the 
jury would be asked to follow is no more logical than the obviously impermissible chain of reasoning 
that someone who has no religious beliefs and is not highly thought of by an authority figure is more 
likely to commit sexual offences against young girls. In those circumstances we see no error on the part 
of the Judge and no miscarriage arising from the Judge's decision not to admit the evidence. 
Phrased as syllogistic reasoning the relevance of Alletson being religious as a young man could 
be examined as follows: 
The evidence at issue: Alletson was a religious person in his younger days (minor premise). 
An issue in the case (which the evidence helps resolve): Alletson is unlikely to have committed sexual 
offending against young girls (conclusion). 
Therefore, in order for the evidence to be relevant a reasonable person must accept the following 
statement as either being the truth or having sufficient validity:  
People who were religious in their younger days are less likely to commit sexual offending against 
young girls (major premise). 
When the Court stated there was not "any logical connection between evidence of religiosity … 
and the likelihood of a person having those characteristics committing sexual offences" they were 
rejecting the validity of the major premise and therefore the evidence was irrelevant for the purpose 
it was being offered.43 By conducting a similar analysis the Court held that evidence of the home 
life of one of the complainants was also irrelevant:44 
  
43  See also R v Evans [2010] NZCA 340, (2010) 25 CRNZ 155 at [18] where the prosecution identified "a 
significant logical flaw" in the evidence of the expert:  
The premise was characterised as an unsophisticated and dated view of sexuality and sexual 
offending; the more so in a case which concerns alleged offending consisting of low level touching 
by someone who was in their mid to late teens at the relevant time. The proposed evidence is based 
on an assumption that sexuality, even in a teenager, is fixed and constant so that it can be safely 
assumed that someone who is of a heterosexual orientation is unlikely to commit offences of the 
present kind. Motivation borne of curiosity or experimentation, to name but two possibilities, can 
be safely ignored. 
44  Alletson, above n 41, at [30]. 
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[30] We do not accept that the evidence of the complainants' home environment was substantially 
helpful in assessing their veracity. The idea that a child who is subject to strict discipline and violence is 
more likely to seek attention by making a false allegation of sexual misconduct against a neighbour than 
a child from a better family environment does not appear to us to be valid. We do not see how the jury 
would have been assisted by this evidence. 
In order for syllogistic reasoning to be a helpful tool in assessing relevance it need not be a 
requirement that the major premise is true – just that it has sufficient validity in order for there to be 
a logical connection between the evidence and what it is being offered to help establish. To use the 
words of Delisle, Stuart and Tanovich again:45 
The probative worth of the relevant evidence depends on the accuracy of the premise which supports the 
inference. Sometimes the premise will be indisputable, sometimes always true, sometimes often true and 
sometimes only rarely true. 
In this way, syllogistic reasoning may be of assistance not just in relation to the decision about 
relevance (where the evidence would be inadmissible if the premise had no or very little validity) 
but also in relation to assessing the probative value and weight of the evidence.  
Drawing factual inferences, as illustrated by the discussion of the case of Alletson, can be 
informed by common sense generalisations that allow conclusions about admissibility (in the case of 
judges) or sufficiency of proof (in the case of fact-finders). For example, the absence of particular 
conduct (such as writing about sexual abuse in a diary) "is rendered meaningful by comparison with 
what we think we, or other people, or reasonable people, would do in the same situation". 46 
However, common sense "is highly acculturated and differentially distributed".47 Judges and fact-
finders bring to their relative tasks their own beliefs and assumptions about the world, which include 
prejudices as well as knowledge:48  
Personal experience, and the beliefs which go with it, are moulded by all of the major psycho-
sociological variables: class, sex/gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, and religion. There is consequently 
much variation between differently-situated groups and individuals, and this has important implications 
for some of the generalizations available to fact-finders in legal proceedings. 
In Cross on Evidence it was acknowledged, in relation to syllogistic reasoning, that "the most 
appropriate way of stating the major premise may be controversial: this depends on one's experience 
  
45  Delisle, Stuart and Tanovich, above n 40, at 148. Compare Jenny McEwan in Evidence and the Adversarial 
Process (2nd ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998) at 10, who argues that the weakness of inductive reasoning 
is that "syllogistic reasoning depends on the correctness of those initial premises which logically proceed to 
the conclusion" (emphasis added). 
46  Boyle, above n 37, at 106. 
47  Roberts and Zuckerman, above n 31, at 146. 
48  At 147. 
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of human nature and the world".49 Feminists, examining the gendered operation of the rules of 
evidence, observe that decisions, especially ones about relevance and probative value "are 
inextricably intertwined with [the] identity and standpoint" of the decision maker. 50  William 
Twining also notes that:51 
In respect of any … generalization one should not assume too readily that there is in fact a "cognitive 
consensus" on the matter. The stock of knowledge in any society varies from group to group, from 
individual to individual and from time to time. Even when there is a widespread consensus, what passes 
as "conventional knowledge" may be untrue, speculative or otherwise defective; moreover "common-
sense generalizations" tend not to be "purely factual" – they often contain a strong mixture of evaluation 
and prejudice, as is illustrated by various kinds of social, national and racial stereotypes. 
To the extent that these observations are accepted, decisions about admissibility may well be 
inconsistent and indeterminate as it is by no means the case that all judges have the same life 
experience and cultural background – in fact, there have been recent efforts across many 
jurisdictions to ensure that there is a far less homogenous judiciary than was historically the case.52 
One way to avoid inconsistent decision making may well be to follow a more self-reflective 
approach to drawing inferences and therefore determining relevance. Such an approach has been 
suggested by Christine Boyle, 53  who focuses on the need for a mindful evaluation of any 
assumptions being made with respect to decisions about relevance:54  
No matter how logical the structure of analysis, assumptions about raped women, homosexual men and 
criminal suspects may distort analysis of both relevance and weight, and thus call particular inferences 
(or their absence) into question … Is there any way in which this inevitable common-sense component, 
which feeds into assessments of relevance whatever the legal test, can be disciplined by law or even by 
good habits of advocacy and judging? In other words, is it possible to develop any criteria for assessing 
the legitimacy of hypothetical probabilities? 
Boyle suggests that although the basic test of relevance is logical relevance, "it should be 
tempered by precedent … critical self-consciousness and the rejection of discriminatory or overly 
speculative common sense".55 Explicit attention to possible counter-assumptions may take the form 
  
49  Mathieson, above n 38, at 26. 
50  Mary Childs and Louise Ellison "Evidence Law and Feminism" in Mary Childs and Louise Ellison (eds) 
Feminist Perspectives on Evidence (Cavendish, London, 2000) 1 at 6. 
51  William Twining Theories of Evidence: Bentham & Wigmore (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1985) at 
146.  
52  Bertha Wilson "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?: The Fourth Annual Barbara Betcherman 
Memorial Lecture" (1992) 30 Family Court Review 13. 
53  Boyle, above n 37, at 95 and from 111. 
54  At 111–112. 
55  At 117. 
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of expert evidence56 or judicial directions57 in some cases, although this of course requires judicial 
recognition that assumptions are contestable.58  
One of Boyle's other criteria for assessing relevance also has merit and may be easier to 
implement: her observation that common-sense assumptions should reflect insights drawn from the 
law of evidence as a whole,59 that is, there should be more reference to appropriate precedents.60 In 
Boyle's view there should be "reasonable consistency in the overall common sense of the law of 
evidence".61  I will now explore this call for consistency with reference to some admissibility 
decisions about a complainant's sexual experience. 
III SYLLOGISTIC REASONING AND CONSISTENCY OF 
ADMISSIBILITY DECISIONS 
Elsewhere, as mentioned, I have examined admissibility decisions about a complainant's 
previous sexual history by applying syllogistic reasoning to these decisions.62 This exercise, which 
"forces into prominence the assumptions or generalisations relied upon",63 exposed, in particular, 
over-reliance on contestable assumptions about male beliefs of women's sexual availability. These 
  
56  Louise Ellison "Closing the credibility gap: The prosecutorial use of expert witness testimony in sexual 
assault cases" (2005) 9 E&P 239. 
57  See for example R v D [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, [2009] Crim LR 591 in which Latham LJ at [11] stated 
that a judge is "entitled to make comments as to the way evidence is to be approached particularly in areas 
where there is a danger of a jury coming to an unjustified conclusion without an appropriate warning". See 
the discussion of the case in Rosemary Pattenden "Case Commentaries" (2009) 13 E&P 141 at 154. In the 
New Zealand context see judicial directions about children's evidence in s 125 of the Evidence Act 2006; 
Taylor v R [2010] NZCA 69 at [74]–[85].  
58  Elisabeth McDonald and Yvette Tinsley "Evidence issues" in McDonald and Tinsely, above n 2, at 371. 
59  Boyle, above n 37, at 112. 
60  Although the same piece of evidence, offered for the same purpose, may be relevant in some cases and not 
in others, so that there must always be a case-by-case analysis of relevance, as Zuckerman notes "past 
decisions can help to identify goals or policies which need to be pursued in the reception of evidence": AAS 
Zuckerman The Principles of Criminal Evidence (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989) at 52. I would go 
further and argue that past decisions should assist with what Boyle calls "self-consciously critical open-
mindedness about fact-finding in context": Boyle, above n 37, at 117.    
61  Boyle, above n 37, at 113. 
62  Elisabeth McDonald "The Relevance of Her Prior Sexual (Mis) Conduct to His Belief in Consent: 
Syllogistic Reasoning and Section 23A of the Evidence Act 1908" (1994) 10 Women's Studies Journal 41; 
and Elisabeth McDonald "An(other) Explanation: The Exclusion of Women's Stories in Sexual Offence 
Trials" in Challenging Law and Legal Processes: the Development of a Feminist  Legal Analysis (New 
Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 1993) 43. 
63  Donald Nicolson "Facing facts: the teaching of fact construction in university law schools" (1997) 1 E&P 
132 at 145. See also Terrence Anderson and William Twining Analysis of Evidence: How to do things with 
facts (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991) at 67. 
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admissibility decisions operated, for example, to validate a defendant's claims that he believed the 
complainant consented as he had been told she had consented to have sex with other men in the 
past.64 Although the heightened relevance test in s 44 of the Act has been relatively effective in 
limiting the extent to which evidence has been admitted under this provision, there are still cases in 
which evidence of the complainant's consensual sexual behaviour with people other than the 
defendant has been admitted as having "direct relevance" to the fact of consent or the defendant's 
belief in consent.65 
For example, in Keegan v R, the Court of Appeal stated that:66 
[T]here was a wealth of material before the Court which could have formed the basis of an application 
under s 44 of the Evidence Act 2006 to cross-examine the complainant about her past sexual experience. 
The material available to [counsel] clearly demonstrated a dysfunctional relationship between the 
complainant, her sister and their mother; it highlighted the complainant's very disturbed behaviour; and, 
most importantly, it showed that she was highly promiscuous and had been engaging in sexual activity 
for some time, including with older men. We formed the view that, in these circumstances, there were 
good prospects that an application under s 44 would have succeeded and that the material which 
emerged would likely be damaging to the complainant's account that the sexual activity with [the 
defendant] was non-consensual. 
Here is syllogistic reasoning applied to the admissibility issue in Keegan: 
The evidence at issue: C (the complainant aged 15) had been having consensual sex with older men 
(minor premise) 
An issue in the case (which the evidence helps resolve): It is likely that C consented to having sex with 
D (aged 30 and her mother's partner) (conclusion) 
Therefore, in order for the evidence to be relevant a reasonable person must accept the following 
statement (the major premise) as either being the truth or having sufficient validity (remembering 
here that as s 44 contains a heightened relevance test the premise should be either "undisputable" or 
"always true"):67  
A 15 year-old girl who has been having consensual sex with older men is likely to consent to sex with 
other older men.  
Despite the relevance of this evidence being somewhat controversial, this statement from 
Keegan is cited – without further explanation – as being of helpful "general guidance" to the 
  
64  Elisabeth McDonald "Her Sexuality as Indicative of His Innocence: The Operation of New Zealand's 'Rape 
Shield' Provision" (1994) 18 Crim LJ at 321. 
65  See for example R v Bourke, above n 32. 
66  Keegan v R, above n 32, at [63]. 
67  Delisle, Stuart and Tanovich, above n 40, at 148.  
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appropriate application of s 44.68 However, in my view the Court of Appeal's approach is actually 
support for the proposition that s 44 is not always operating to effectively exclude irrelevant and 
unfairly prejudicial material.69 The point here is that the rules contained in the Evidence Act 2006 
will often be applied in a way that results in different outcomes, even where the facts are very 
similar. As in other areas of the law, admissibility decisions are to an extent subjective and therefore 
"political" and will turn on the perspectives brought to the process by counsel and the members of 
the judiciary involved. These perspectives will include different views of individual responsibility 
and competing interpretations of inter-personal and intimate communication.  
Other major premises I have extracted from admissibility decisions about a complainant's sexual 
experience include: 
(a) Men believe that women they know have had consensual sex with another man are likely 
to consent to having sex with them too.70 
(b) Women who claim to have been similarly sexually assaulted more than once in similar 
circumstances are likely to have fabricated the second incident.71 
(c) Girls who are given love bites by their boyfriend and show them to their girlfriends are 
likely to consent to having sex with older men.72 
Although it is not the case that a logical connection between previous sexual experience and 
consent is discovered in every case,73 the fact that there are cases in which a logical connection is 
found raises a consistency concern. However, my focus here is not consistency of admission among 
such cases, but the refusal to admit evidence of an absence of sexual experience on the grounds that 
such evidence is irrelevant to the issue of consent. This issue has arisen in two decisions. In Grace v 
R74 and Leef v R,75 the Court of Appeal held that evidence of the complainant's virginity prior to the 
alleged offending was irrelevant and inadmissible:76 
  
68  Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [EA44.01]. 
69  See Elisabeth McDonald and Yvette Tinsley "Evidence issues" in McDonald and Tinsley, above n 2, at 371. 
70  R v Bourke, above n 32; and R v Phillips (1989) 5 CRNZ 405 (HC). 
71  R v Accused (CA 92/92) [1993] 1 NZLR 553 (CA). 
72  R v Taria (1993) 10 CRNZ 14 (HC). 
73  See for example W (CA247/10) v R [2010] NZCA 561. 
74  Grace v R [2011] NZCA 590. 
75  Leef v R [2011] NZCA 567. 
76  Grace v R, above n 74, at [10] (emphasis added). In Leef v R, above n 75, the Court stated at [16]: "C's prior 
sexual experience, or the lack of it, is not generally probative of whether she consented". 
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[10] We are satisfied that the [trial] Judge was right to direct the jury to ignore the evidence of virginity. 
The evidence went to prior sexual experience, so was prima facie inadmissible under s 44 of the 
Evidence Act 2006. The premise of that section is that prior sexual experience, or the lack of it, says 
nothing about whether a complainant engaged in consensual sexual activity with a particular person in 
a particular setting. 
I agree with the italicised words. However, given that consent is to a person and not a set of 
circumstances, previous sexual experience should always be considered irrelevant to the issue of 
whether there was consent given on another occasion to a different person. In this context there 
should be consistency of approach with regard to the drawing of logical inferences. The decisions in 
Grace and Leef cannot sit comfortably alongside the statement in Keegan. 
In B (SC12/2013) v R,77 dealing in part with the meaning of reputation evidence for the purposes 
of s 44(2), William Young J, delivering a minority verdict for the Supreme Court, was of the view 
that lack of sexual experience is outside the ambit of s 44 – and the admissibility such evidence 
should be governed by ss 7 and 8.78 Even if this is correct,79 it does not alter the requirement for the 
evidence to be sufficiently relevant to be admitted, which again turns on the content of the major 
premises applied.  
This discussion illustrates how the application of admissibility rules can operate to reinforce 
questionable beliefs about women's sexuality and behaviour (rape myths), which can add to 
complainant distress and discomfort at trial. But it is not only the admission of evidence which is of 
concern, and impacts on the negative experience of complainants in a rape trial, but also how 
complainants are expected to participate in the trial process. Both aspects of rape trials 
(admissibility rules and process rules) need to be reformed in order to appropriately improve the 
experience of rape complainants, in particular their sense that there has been a fair trial and a just 
outcome, even in the absence of a conviction. 
IV EVIDENTIAL RULES AND FAIR PROCESS 
Given that admissibility decisions under s 44 have exposed questionable logical links between 
the evidence and the issue at trial, it is unsurprising that lack of protection from questioning about 
their sexual experience with people other than the defendant contributes to the feeling expressed by 
complainants that they are the ones on trial.  Unfortunately their experiences have not changed 
significantly, despite decades of reform of substantive and procedural law. These statements made 
by rape complainants, 25 years apart, provide a powerful example of the lack of real change: 
  
77  B (SC12/2013) v R, above n 26. 
78  At [119]. 
79  This approach overlooks the cases in which fantasies or fabrication about sexual offending has been 
admitted under s 23A. See further Richard Mahoney and others The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis 
(3rd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2014) at [EV44.03]. 
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Just having to get up there and tell a room full of people in detail about what happened. … It's not a nice 
thing to have to talk about – being forced to have sex in front of a whole lot of people. I thought I was 
going to be killed when I was raped. If I had, I would have been spared this – it was worse than the rape 
itself. If that's justice, I'd never report another rape (1983).80 
It was horrible. I was exhausted; like every part of my body that night was so sore. And it was 
embarrassing and kind of degrading and disgusting and I felt kind of like I was the one on trial because 
you know the things they ask you and the things they imply and you're in a room full of people, 90 
percent of whom I don't know talking about intimate sexual stuff (2009).81 
Despite these views consistently expressed about how difficult it has been historically to 
participate in the criminal justice system as a victim of sexual offending, a pronouncement made by 
Sir Matthew Hale in 1680 still is validated in contemporary cases – he opined that rape "is an 
accusation easily to be made" "but harder to be defended".82 In 2010 defence counsel in O'Donnell v 
R included the following statement in his closing address to the jury:83 
I point out that, in fact, a rape is a very serious allegation and it's so easy [for] someone to say, "I was 
raped". Very easy to say, and unfortunately in most cases, as in this, it can be difficult to disprove.  
In 2011 in Payne v R the Court acknowledged that it is a "common defence submission" that an 
allegation of sexual abuse is easy to make but hard to refute.84 
In reality it remains very hard to complain. As observed in the Ministry of Women's Affairs 
funded research in 2009,85 the community has become aware of the trauma of being involved in a 
rape trial through media reporting, and this knowledge, along with other deterrents such as family 
pressure, can contribute to under-reporting and attrition. Survivors' fear of disbelief and of having 
their character and credibility destroyed in court can be powerful disincentives to reporting to police 
or continuing through the criminal justice process. Very few rape/sexual assault cases proceed to 
court, and research in this area already cited has typically found the experience of the trial to be 
arduous and traumatic for all complainants. One of the hardest aspects to manage, not surprisingly, 
  
80  Joan Stone, Rosemary Barrington and Colin Bevan "The Victim Survey" in Institute of Criminology  Rape 
Study Volume 2: Research Reports (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1983) at 52 and 55. 
81  Kingi and others, above n 7, at [7.3.2]. 
82  Matthew Hale, George Wilson and Thomas Dogherty The History of the Pleas of the Crown (Payne, 
London, 1800) at 635. 
83  O'Donnell v R [2010] NZCA 352 at [28]. 
84  Payne v R [2011] NZCA 127 at [10]. 
85  Ministry of Women's Affairs, above n 10, at 40. 
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has been defence counsel's cross-examination, with this experienced as akin to the initial rape 
experience.86  
The results from the 2009 study indicate this is still the case. Going to court was described as a 
fearful and humiliating experience, and one that most victim/survivors felt they needed high levels 
of support to manage. 
Defence lawyers themselves publically state that they would actually counsel a family member 
against reporting sexual offending: 
As a practicing lawyer, I was always of the view, and so was my family, that it would only be in the 
most extreme circumstances that you would ever advise a woman to participate in the criminal process if 
she was alleging that she had been raped.87 
Alas, I would never advise members of my family to report a rape. And that is the fundamental question 
which should be addressed because that is the 90% we are talking about (the women who don't 
report).88 
Despite decades of law reform the issues remain the same and are unresolved. Elizabeth Sheehy 
has observed that:89 
[E]very law reform in evidence law that has been generated to overcome sex discrimination in the 
adjudication of rape has been met with counter-moves by the defence bar and the re-emergence of myths 
and stereotypes about women, men and rape in the guise of new legal practices and judicial discourses. 
So change may not be effected just by law reform – it is not just a question of tinkering with 
rules but reconsidering the whole process, as was concluded by the President of the New Zealand 
Law Commission in 2008:90 
[T]he [Law] Commission … has arrived at the view that all is not well with the traditional trial process 
in New Zealand in relation to sexual offending. The issues that have come to our notice during the 
  
86  Joan Stone, Rosemary Barrington and Colin Bevan "The Victim Survey" in Institute of Criminology Rape 
Study Volume 2: Research Reports (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1983) at 55; Responding to Sexual 
Violence, above n 7, at [7.3.2]. 
87  Antony Ellis "The Rape Trial: Are the Scales of Justice Evenly Balanced?" in Juliet Broadmore, Carol 
Shand and Tania Warburton (eds) The Proceedings of Rape: Ten years' progress? (Doctors for Sexual 
Abuse Care (NZ), Wellington, 1996) 82 at 83.  
88  Paul Dacre "Defence Counsel's Perspective" in Juliet Broadmore, Carol Shand and Tania Warburton (eds) 
The Proceedings of Rape: Ten years' progress? (Doctors for Sexual Abuse Care (NZ), Wellington, 1996) 99 
at 102. 
89  Elizabeth Sheehy "Evidence Law and 'Credibility Testing' of Women: A Comment on the E Case" (2002) 2 
QUT Law JJ 157 at 173.  
90  Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants' Previous Convictions, Similar Offending, and Bad 
Character (NZLC R103, 2008) at v (emphasis added).  
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course of this project cannot simply be cured by changes to the law of evidence. Problems in the system 
flow from the features of the adversarial system of trial that is, as presently constituted, an essential 
feature of our system of justice in New Zealand … For these reasons the Commission has concluded 
that there could be value in investigating whether the adversarial system should be modified or replaced 
with some alternative model, either for sex offences or for some wider class of offences. 
It is sobering to compare this statement to that made by Richard Prebble, Labour MP for 
Auckland Central, on 18 August 1976:91 
I suggest, therefore, that if most women are afraid today to make a complaint to the police in cases of 
rape – and I believe they are – they will continue to be afraid to do so even if this [evidence law] 
amendment … is passed… We should look at the whole law and see if we need a fundamental 
alteration in the way we deal with rape cases. 
The argument for bigger and bolder change has been made for some time and resulted in our 
work which was published in 2011 and also the Law Commission's project in 2012 looking at 
alternative trial processes – currently not on the Minister of Justice's reform agenda. The Law 
Commission's first review of the Evidence Act 2006 recommended no changes to s 44 (except a pre-
trial notice requirement) and stated that the review was not a place for a review of policy regarding 
specific issues for complainants in rape cases or other vulnerable witnesses.92 However, on 16 June 
2014 the first report of the Glenn Inquiry concluded that "the courts system was seen by the majority 
of people as being broken and dysfunctional" and there should be a system that instead "promotes 
the wellbeing of victims". 93  But will more law reform make a difference to complainant's 
experiences given the failure of previous reforms? 
On this point Victoria Nourse has argued that "legal reform is a work in progress. Statutory 
reform rarely ends anything. It may transform the debate, yet it would be naïve to believe that it 
could end a matter as ancient as sexism."94 This too has been acknowledged over time:95 
[T]he process has revealed the limitations of legal change. By themselves, the changes to the law are not 
likely to affect the reportage of rape, and opinion is divided as to whether the trauma of the Courtroom 
trial for the victim will be lessened. … Those working in victim support services believe that unless 
there is some commitment made to these wider aspects of public education and moves towards the 
prevention of rape, then the changes in the law reform process are mere tinkering (1984).  
  
91  (18 August 1976) 405 NZPD 1757 (emphasis added). 
92  Law Commission Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R127, 2013) at [1.41]. 
93  Denise Wilson and Melinda Webber The People's Report (The Glenn Inquiry, 2013) at 118. 
94  Victoria Nourse "The 'Normal' Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law" (2000) 75 Chi 
Kent L Rev 951 at 978.  
95  Rosemary Barrington "The Rape Law Reform Process in New Zealand" (1984) 8 Crim LJ 307 at 322 and 
324. 
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It seems to me that what is needed, together with reform of law and practice, is a change of 
attitude, a change in understanding, a change to mindsets and beliefs, not just of lawyers, judges and 
police officers, but of potential jurors. Jennifer Temkin makes this point very well:96 
Despite all the efforts and undoubted improvements over the past thirty years, the rape trial as it is 
configured in the common law world is frequently not up to the task of delivering justice for rape 
victims … It is often said that the problem in rape cases is simply lack of evidence, or that it is just one 
person's word against another. Our analysis shows that it is not necessarily the lack of evidence but the 
attitude towards the evidence which matters … The view taken here is that changing attitudes, 
preventing stereotypical notions from infiltrating decision-making and replacing these notions with a 
realistic understanding of the problem of rape is one of the keys to achieving justice for its victims.  
For example, to go back to the discussion of syllogistic reasoning, the required attitudinal 
change should result in reinforcing the following beliefs as "major premises" when making all 
admissibility decisions:97 
Women do not usually lie about being raped. 
Women may choose to have sex with many men and still retain the right to say no. 
Women may choose to have a drink with a man at his house and also choose not to have sex with him. 
Such attitudinal changes would, I believe, have a flow-on effect into the trial process, even if no 
alternatives to the adversarial trial model are adopted. To again use the words of Louise Nicholas:98 
The courtroom should be about balance, fairness and seeking the truth. Not about trying to discredit a 
person because of the amount of alcohol consumed, the type of clothing worn or because s/he walked 
home alone. 
V CONCLUSION 
Over (at least) the last 35 years, policy makers and law reformers have been concerned about the 
rules of evidence and procedure as applied in cases involving allegations of sexual offending. In 
1977 such concern led to the introduction of s 23A. The 1983 Rape Study gave rise to a significant 
number of reforms in 1986, and most recently the Evidence Act 2006 introduced significant changes 
– especially the introduction of a total bar on a complainant's "reputation in sexual matters" in s 
44(2). Despite decades worth of well-intentioned reforms of law and practice, the operation of the 
rules of evidence still disclose reinforcement of the types of beliefs that the reforms were aimed at 
challenging. Focussing on New Zealand's rape shield provision, now found in s 44(1) of the 
  
96  Temkin and Krahé, above n 4, at 209 and 211.  
97  A number of current cases do in fact draw on or allude to supportable major premises when considering 
admission of sexual history evidence. See for example Brown v R [2014] NZCA 110 at [27]; B (SC12/2013) 
v R, above n 26, at [62]; and Demetriades v R [2013] NZCA 31 at [21]. 
98  Te Ohaakii a Hine – National Network Ending Sexual Violence Together, above n 8, at 79. 
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Evidence Act 2006, I have critiqued a number of admissibility decisions. In my view, the exercise of 
judicial discretion in such cases indicates that questionable rape mythology is still present at trial. 
It is not only the content of questions that are problematic and cause complainants to feel that 
they are on trial. The types of questions and the nature of the cross-examination process is still 
reported as being harrowing, demeaning and disrespectful – to the point that judges and lawyers are 
critical of the trial process in rape cases. Further work needs to be done to explore alternative ways 
of testing evidence without re-traumatising witnesses, including those in cases of sexual offending. 
More reform alone is not the answer. Any legislative change must be accompanied by education 
aimed at challenging and changing the beliefs of those working in the criminal justice system – as 
well as the members of the public who will make up the jury. It is challenging societal attitudes and 
debunking rape mythology that is most likely to result in real change:99  
[T]he attitudes and behaviour of the legal professionals who apply the rules are often as important in 
practice as the content of the rules themselves. Such attitudes and behaviour might be a more promising 
target for reformers keen to improve the lot of sexual assault complainants, rather than tinkering with 
technical evidentiary rules of admissibility which often appear unresponsive to reformer's best 
endeavours. 
Such are the challenges for the next 35 years. 
 
 
  
99  Roberts and Zuckerman, above n 31, at 450. 
